Learning and Technology Adoptions by Scholz, Sebastian
Sebastian Scholz:
Learning and Technology Adoptions
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2010-5
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11321/
Learning and Technology Adoptions∗
Sebastian Scholz†
MGSE, University of Munich
January 13, 2010
Abstract
This essay studies the optimal timing for a firm to adopt a new process
innovation in the presence of learning. A policy that has been imple-
mented by governments throughout the world to reduce the cost level
of infant industries with positive externalities, is to either subsidize the
research of these technologies or their distribution. This model demon-
strates how government interventions can affect the optimal timing for
adoption of a new technology. Furthermore this essay makes predictions
on how the effects change, when the total quantity that can be produced
is fixed; the installations of wind powered energy plants exemplify this
point. Depending on whether producer rents, consumer rents or early
implementation are more important to the government, the model offers
the appropriate tools to attain its objective.
Keywords: Learning, Process Innovation, Optimal Control, Infant industry
JEL Classifications: C61, D42, H23, O12
1 Introduction
Typical infant industries are characterized by cost reductions through learning
in the production process, and continuous new technology adoptions. Mature
industries are often characterized by numerous technology generations, while
learning takes place at the same time.1 Market players try to find new tech-
nologies that are more sustainable, efficient and safer, however, at the same
∗This paper was written with the support of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(SFB/TR 15). For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Ray Rees, Monika Schnitzer,
Sven Rady and seminar/ conference participants at the University of Munich, Intertic (Milan,
2008), EARIE (Toulouse, 2008) and INFORMS (Washington DC, 2008). All remaining errors
are mine.
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1Currently produced nuclear power plants for example use the 3rd technology generation,
the 4th generation will be deployed some time around 2030.
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time they are improving existing technologies. Thus it is important to connect
both: experience and innovations in a single model. In this dynamic framework
a firm can adopt innovation breakthroughs from its research department. In ad-
dition, the firm decides upon a pricing rule for each point in time. It is assumed
that experience spills over to the next technology generation after an innovation
breakthrough has been adopted. The empirical literature till present, has con-
centrated on learning models, in which technology spillovers were absent (Irwin
and Klenow, 1994). Jamasb (2007) is an exception: in his purely econometric
analysis, he estimates learning by doing and research rates for a range of en-
ergy technologies in different stages of technical progress. He separates the cost
reduction effect caused by learning and research, expressed by cumulative sales
and patents. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain data on costs, which makes
the study rely on very few data points.
This model shall be the theoretical foundation of applied work, in which firms
can use the experience, they have accumulated thus far, for the next technology
generation. In macroeconomics, there are studies, where the experience gained
from learning, is passed on from one generation to the next. Examples are
Young (1993) and Parente (1994). Young makes clear that innovations occur
in markets that are large. In this setup, production costs do not decrease with
new technology adoptions, but rather through learning. In Parente’s model,
learning and technology adoptions occur both after the product introduction.
A firm faces a trade-off between learning at a decreasing rate or switching to
a new technology, which is costly as not all expertise can be transferred. In
return, the learning curve becomes steeper. From a microeconomic perspective,
both models face one problem in particular: learning occurs only through time
and not through cumulative production or "by doing". Therefore the strategic
pricing behavior of firms can not be analyzed. This paper introduces a model,
where firms simultaneously choose a research budget and the optimal production
quantity, exploiting the learning effect optimally. The production and the time
of technology adoptions are control variables of the firm.
This research has two main objectives: firstly, to describe the market equi-
librium of a setup that accounts for innovations and learning; and secondly, to
show the effects of subsidies on the market equilibrium. The second objective
is based on the observation that products produced by learning industries have
often rendered positive externalities in the past; renewable energy technologies
can be cited as examples. The production cost per unit of electricity has been
reduced significantly for technologies that are powered by wind, sunlight and
biomass. The positive externality is the deduction of the carbon dioxide level
in the atmosphere, because electricity from renewable energy is a perfect sub-
stitute to conventionally generated electricity.2 It is illustrated that sales and
innovation subsidies have the same effect on the innovation date and prices, if
and only if the innovation date and total cumulative production quantity are
2Another example is the aerospace technology, which was mainly developed for military
purposes during the 1930s and 40s. This was a stepping stone for the development of com-
mercially used airplanes, which has enabled societies to travel and trade at an increased pace.
The learning effect in this industry was described by Wright (1936).
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endogenous. Effects differ significantly, when the total quantity that can be
produced in a market is fixed. An example for such products, whose costs are
affected by learning are wind power plants. In Germany the installation of on-
shore wind power plants reached its peak in 2002, with an installed capacity of
over 3000 MW. The installed capacity in 2009 was estimated to be less than
1000 MW due to a lack of suitable space (Dena, 2005). The cost of produc-
ing wind power capacity has fallen drastically; the price of 1 KW wind energy
capacity fell by 29% between 1990 and 2004 (Iset, 2005).
The layout of this model is as follows: a social planner or monopolist learn
with some learning parameter λ, and it can choose any particular date in the
future, when they would like to adopt a new technology. This is characterized
by an increase of the learning parameter to γ, where γ ≥ λ. After the innovation
date, newly gained experience reduces the present level of cost by more, than
before the innovation date. Thus the process innovation described here, is a
substitute to learning. A firm can adopt a new technology when its research
department has been successful. The cost of research is given by a convex
and decreasing function a(t1), where t1 is the date of innovation. When firms
prefer an earlier innovation date over that of a late one, then they employ more
researchers; this is reflected by a higher innovation cost in the model. The setting
is deterministic to avoid unnecessary complications, which would not add any
further results. Players choose the date of innovation at the beginning of the
planning horizon; production starts thereafter. In the first step, a pricing rule
is derived for an exogenous innovation date, which is endogenized thereafter.
The findings of this paper are: the social planner/ monopolist charges two
different prices, for the time phases before the innovation and after the innova-
tion. Both prices are constant for a constant price elasticity of demand. After
the innovation has occurred, the decision maker’s price rule, is such that the
price (social planner) or the marginal revenue (monopolist) equal marginal cost
at the last unit produced. This result is analogous to the findings of Spence
(1981) who examined learning in the absence of innovations. However before
the innovation occurs, the social planner’s (monopolist’s) price rule is such that
the price (marginal cost) equals marginal cost at t1 plus a negative constant. At
the time of innovation, the costate variables of the two phases equal the ratio
of the learning parameters λ/γ. Thus there is a downward jump in prices at
the innovation date. In a second step, a subsidy on innovation cost and a sub-
sidy on sales are introduced. The central results of these market interventions
are: innovation subsidies and distribution subsidies reduce the prices of both
phases if all variables (the timing of innovation t1, the cumulative production
quantities at the innovation date; y(t1) and at the end of the planning horizon
y(T )) are endogenous. Both subsidy types induce innovation to proceed earlier.
Consequently the total quantity produced during the entire planning horizon
increases. The production plan in the presence of subsidies lies entirely above
the production plan without subsidies. The result being, if early distribution
yield positive externalities, then subsidies on sales and on innovation contain an
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additional positive effect.3
It is also shown that a subsidy on innovation cost (sales), which is financed
through a tax on sales (innovation cost) changes the proportion of consumer
and producer rents. Customers generally benefit more from sales subsidies,
producers from innovation subsidies. Another central result emerges, when the
total production y(T ) is restricted. In this case the two kinds of subsidies that
are analyzed have different effects.
The next section introduces the model and solves for an optimal pricing rule,
which is analyzed in detail. Section 3 endogenizes the timing of innovation.
Section 4 continues with a welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model with an exogenous innovation date
This model is solved for different market structures, at first the social planner’s
problem is solved, which can be easily extended to account for a market with
perfect competition that yields quite similar results. The learning by doing case
without innovation has been examined similarly by Brueckner et al. (1983).
Later a monopolist takes the place of the social planner. This scenario is more
relevant to reality, because in an environment of innovations, patents guarantee
that their holders are able to execute market power. It has been rarely observed
that a state runs a public firm in a learning industry, nevertheless a social
planner’s actions are examined as though they are almost identical to those of
a monopolist.
2.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
Assume there is a publicly owned firm, which faces the demand function: x(p(t), t)
for a non-storable output x(t) that is sold at a price p(t). Time is denoted by
t ∈ R0+. The beginning of the first phase, when the planning horizon begins is
t0. The time when the innovation takes place is t1. It is the end of the first
phase and the beginning of the second phase. The planning horizon ends at
t = T . The firm chooses an optimal time path for its control variables during
the first phase, p0(t) and the second phase, p1(t); where p(t) = {p0(t), p1(t)}
The instantaneous production flows of the first and second phase are x0(p0(t), t)
and x1(p1(t), t) respectively. They are the derivatives of the state variables y0(t)
and y1(t), which are the cumulative production quantities for a period t before
and after the innovation. Over the intervals [t0, t1] and [t0, T ], the social planner
receives a stream of consumption benefits discounted back to t = t0,
3For technologies in the renewable energy sector holds that early distributions increase
their positive externality on the atmosphere more. The total carbon dioxide emissions are
reduced more, because renewable energy sources can substitute conventional C02 emitting
ones earlier.
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Z t1
t0
B0(p0(t), t)e−r(t−t0)dt and
Z T
t1
B1(p1(t), t)e−r(t−t0)dt (1)
where B0(p0(t), t) and B1(p1(t), t) denote the per-period social surplus dur-
ing the first and second phase. They are each equivalent to the area below the
inverse demand function at some t, before and after t1, respectively. The social
planner faces a marginal cost that consists of two parts; a fixed part denoted
by the parameter m, and a variable part that is equal to c at the beginning of
the first phase, when experience y0(t) equals zero. This variable part decreases
with a learning parameter λ before an innovation occurs. Intuitively there is
continuous discounting involved, which is expressed by the exponential term.
MC0(y0(t)) = m+ ce−λy0(t) for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 (2)
The social planner can adopt a new technology, when the research depart-
ment has been successful. The faster an innovation occurs, the more costly it is.
For now, the innovation cost function depends solely on the innovation date t1.
When no innovation occurs and the firm produces with the same technology dur-
ing the entire planning horizon, then the innovation cost is zero; a(t1) > 0,∇t
\ t = T where a(T ) = 0. a0 < 0, a00 > 0. A new technology is adopted right
after the innovation. Otherwise, if a later date of innovation is preferred, the
planner could reduce its cost by devoting fewer resources to its research depart-
ment. A different cost function is introduced in section 2.4. The innovation
cost is assumed to be paid in advance at t0. After t1 the firm faces more inten-
sive learning; it learns with a learning parameter γ ≥ λ. Experience completely
transfers to the new technology . Switching costs are ignored, because they
do not yield results, which extend the knowledge of the existing literature (see
Parente, 1993). The second phase’s marginal costs are
MC1(y1(t)) = m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)] for t1 < t ≤ T (3)
Thus the social planner’s objective is,
Max
p0(t), p1(t), t1
SP ≡
Z t1
t0
e−r(t−t0)
n
B0(p0(t), t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t))x0[p0(t), t]
o
dt
(4)
−a(t1)e−rt0+
Z T
t1
e−r(t−t0)
n
B1(p1(t), t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)])x1[p1(t), t]
o
dt,
where ∂Bi∂pi = pi(t)
∂xi[pi(t),t]
∂pi(t)
for i ∈ (0, 1). The constraints of the problem are
given by
·
y0(t) = x0[p0(t), t] t ∈ [t0, t1] (5)
·
y1(t) = x1[p1(t), t] t ∈ [t1, T ] (6)
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y0(t0) = 0 (7)
y0(t1) = y1(t1) = y(t1) is free (8)
y1(T ) is free (9)
·
y0(t) and
·
y1(t) are time derivatives of cumulative production quantities or
experience stocks. To keep this analysis simple, a real interest rate of zero is
assumed. In the appendix it is shown, how the equilibrium changes when r 6= 0.
Flows are functions of the price and time, where the price itself is a function of
time. The cumulative quantity cannot change over night, when the innovation
takes place and the new production process is adopted (8). Condition (9) is used
as a transversality condition for the second phase. Necessary conditions of this
problem are derived in two steps. Firstly this study examines some innovation
date t1 ∈ [t0, T ] and solves for the price paths p0(t) and p1(t) with t1 being
fixed. In the next step the innovation date is endogenized.
Proposition 1 A social planner chooses a constant price for each period of
phase one and two respectively. The two prices are different across phase one
[t0, t1] and phase two [t1, T ].
Proof By a theorem of Hestens, take SP (4) with a fix t1 and define η0(t)
on the interval [t0, t1] and η1(t) on the interval [t1, T ] as the costate variables
of the cumulative quantities y0(t) and y1(t) respectively.4 The innovation cost
function is a(t1). It can be ignored during the time the pricing rule is analyzed,
because t1 is fixed. Thus a(t1) is constant and drops out of the first order
condition that describes the optimal pricing rule. The Hamiltonian is
H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] = B0(t)− C0(t) +B1(p1(t), t)− C1(t) (10)
−a(t1) + η0(t)x[p0(t), t] + η1(t)x[p1(t), t]
where Ci(t) = xi(t)MCi(yi(t)) for i ∈ (0, 1) is the per-period cost. p∗0(t) and
p∗1(t) maximize (10) such that
H [p∗0(t), p
∗
1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] ≥ H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] (11)
for all p0(t) ≥ 0, p1(t) ≥ 0.
The pricing rule for the first phase (t ≤ t1)
As p∗0(t) maximizes H for (t ≤ t1), the necessary condition is
∂H
∂p0(t)
= p0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
−∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
(m+ce−λy0(t))+η0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
.
= 0
4 see Takayama p.658
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⇔ p0(t) = m+ ce−λy0(t) − η0(t) (12)
The social planner sets a price that equals the marginal cost minus the shadow
price of cumulative quantity at some t. The second necessary condition is
·
η0(t) = −
∂H
∂y0(t)
⇔ η0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + const1 (13)
The third necessary condition is (5).
Lemma 2 The shadow price at the end point of the first phase equals η0(t1) =
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ).
Proof. See appendix.
The second necessary condition (13) can be solved for const1 with the transver-
sality condition η0(t1) = −λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) . Evaluating η0(t)
at t1
const1 = −
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ− γ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
=⇒ η0(t) = ce−λy0(t) −
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ− γ
γ
ce−λy(t1) (14)
(13) and (14) solve for the price of the first phase
p0 = m+
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ); t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 (15)
During the first phase, p0 is independent of time, which completes the first part
of the proof of 1
The pricing rule for the second phase (t > t1)
The necessary first order condition with respect to p1(t) can be solved for a
function of the the second phase’s costate
∂H
∂p1(t)
= p1(t)
∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
−∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
(m+ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)])+η1(t)
∂x1(p1(t), t)
∂p1(t)
.
= 0
⇔ p1(t) = m+ ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)] − η1(t) (16)
The social planner’s price is equal to the marginal cost minus the shadow price
of cumulative quantity. The second condition that needs to be fulfilled is
·
η1(t) = −
∂H
∂y1(t)
⇔ η1(t) = ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)] + const2 (17)
The third condition is given by (6). η(T ) = 0, because the value of experience
at the end of the second phase is zero. The cumulative quantity at the end of
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the second phase is not restricted, hence (9) can be used to set up the following
transversality condition, which solves for const2.
const2 = −ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
=⇒ η1(t) = ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)] − ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) (18)
(17) and (18) are used to express the second phase’s price
p1 = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ); t1 ≤ t ≤ T (19)
For any t where t1 ≤ t ≤ T , the price of phase 2 is constant. This completes
the second part of proposition 1’s proof.
It is assumed that the demand function does not change over time, thus the
planner produces the same quantity in each period within the first phase and
the same quantity within the second phase. The intuition behind this result
is: although costs decrease through time, which would yield lower prices in a
static model, the decrease of costs is completely offset by the decrease of the
experience value in this dynamic framework. When either γ = λ or t1 = T , then
(15) and (19) are equal: p0(t) = p1(t) = m + ce−λy(T ). For γ > λ or t1 < T ,
the price of the first phase exceeds the price of the second, which is as follows
p0 > p1
⇔ λ
γ
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ− γ
γ
e−λy(t1) > e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
⇔ λ− γ
γ
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) >
λ− γ
γ
e−λy(t1)
γ[y(t1)− y(T )] < 0
As the last expression holds, it follows that the claim p0 > p1 is correct.
A social planner encounters a loss, because during the first phase, the price is
below the marginal cost at t1, during the second phase the price just covers its
cost at t = T and is below that level for all preceding periods. Therefore one
would need to introduce a tax on a different market to compensate for the loss.
The monopolist’s problem is solved, before the results, which are quite similar
are interpreted further.
2.2 The Monopolist’s Problem
The monopolist’s instantaneous profit functions for the two phases are,
π0(t) ≡
h
p0(t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t))
i
x0(p0(t), t) : t ∈ [t0, t1] (20)
π1(t) ≡
h
p1(t)− (m+ ce−λy0(t1)−γ[y(t)−y0(t1)])
i
x1(p1(t), t) : t ∈ [t1, T ]
(21)
8
where the variables and parameters are defined and interpreted in the social
planner’s problem. The firm’s objective is,
Max MP =
Z t1
t0
π0(t)e−r(t−t0)dt− a(t1)e−rt0 +
Z T
t1
π1(t)e−r(t−t0)dt (22)
subject to constraints (5) to (9). In the absence of discounting, the Hamiltonian
equals
H [p0(t), p1(t), η0(t), η1(t)] = π
0(t)+π1(t)−a(t1)+ η0(t)x[p0(t), t]+η1(t)x[p1(t), t]
(23)
One can use the same methods that were used to derive (15) and (19) to
derive the pricing rules when a monopolist is the decision maker
p0
µ
1− 1
ε(t)
¶
= m+ ce−λy(t1) − η0(t)
where ε(t) = −∂x0
∂p0
p0
x0
⇒MR0(t) = m+ce−λy(t1)−
∙
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¸
; t0 ≤ t ≤ t1
(24)
(24) is the pricing rule before the innovation date,
p1
µ
1− 1
ε(t)
¶
= m+ ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)] − η1(t)
where ε(t) = −∂x1
∂p1
p1
x1
⇒MR1(t) = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) (25)
and (25) the innovation date after t1. Therefore the monopolist sets the
price where the marginal revenue equals marginal cost minus the shadow price
of cumulative quantity. The only difference to the social planner’s problem is
that the optimal rule contains the multiplier (1 − 1ε(t) ), and thus the marginal
revenue and not the price, appears in the optimality condition. Prices in the
monopoly model are constant for constant elasticities ε(t) = ε, hence the same
holds for the per period production quantities. When either the equality γ = λ
or t1 = T hold, then (24) reduces to (25): MR0(t) = MR1(t) = m+ ce−λy(T ).
This is the classical optimal pricing behavior of a learning monopolist in the
absence of innovations shown by Spence (1981): "At every time, output should
be profit maximizing output, given that marginal cost is the unit cost that
obtains at the end of the period".5 The total cost that a firm faces is the area
5See page 52.
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underneath the learning curve or marginal cost curve between t0 and T . If the
firm increases output by 0, in any interval within [t0, t1] or by 1, in any interval
within [t1, T ], then the incremental cost is not the cost that arises during that
time. It is rather the change of the total area below the learning curve.
Proposition 3 In the presence of innovations, a monopolist charges a price
such that marginal revenue equals incremental cost at any point in time.
Proof. See appendix.
Consequently, within the interval [t1, T ] the monopolist prices optimally,
when the marginal revenue at each point in time equals the marginal cost of
the last unit produced. MR1(t) = MC|t=T by (25). In the interval [t0, t1] the
monopolist charges MR0(t) = MC|t=t1 −λγ
£
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
by (24), where the sum in brackets is positive. Consequently, the monopolist
charges a lower price such that marginal revenue at each point in time is below
the marginal cost of the last unit produced at t1, because production continues
beyond t1. The "price discount" equals λγ
£
ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − ce−λy(t1)
¤
.6
It contains information about how much the experience level y(t1) is worth for
the production after t1. In the next section this term is analyzed further.
If discounting is included in the analysis, then prices increase compared to
those in (24) and (25) for all t. When future profits are discounted, then learning
is valued less, because the experience payoff decreases. Thus in the presence of
a positive discount rate, the firm increase its price over the entire planning
horizon. In a model without discounting, learning is appreciated most in the
beginning of the planning horizon, because its return lasts for a long period
of time. In the absence of innovations the price difference between a model
with and without a discount rate, reaches its peak at t0. In this model, where
innovation increases the learning parameter, the price difference could even be
larger at t1 than at t0, because the learning intensity jumps. At T , prices that
include discounting are equal to those where discounting is absent, because the
return to experience is non-existing.
Proposition 4 When r 6= 0, then a monopolist sets its price during the first
phase, such that the following condition holds,MR0(t) = m+λγ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )+
γ−λ
γ ce
−λy(t1)+
r
Z t1
t
£
m+ ce−λy0(τ)
¤
e−r(τ−t)dτ+r
R T
t1
[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−r(τ−t)dτ . Dur-
ing the second phase the optimality condition isMR1(t) = m+ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T)
+
r
Z T
t
h
m+ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(τ)
i
e−r(τ−t)dτ
Proof. See appendix.
The additional terms on the right hand side are positive, which implies that the
price increases. At r = 0, the conditions reduce to (24) and (25).
6To be precise, the price discount also contains the constant multiplier

1− 1ε
−1
, which
is ignored in the following partial analysis.
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The market equilibrium of a social planner and a monopolist are quite simi-
lar. In the past, infant industries have been heavily subsidized by governments,
but they were not run as public firms. Examples are the aerospace and defense
industry during and after World War Two, computer industries in the 1980/90s
and firms that have operated in the renewable energy sector during the last
10 years. In the presence of learning and innovations, where the later can be
protected by property rights, there are either monopolies or oligopolies in the
market. This holds true for all industries mentioned above: Airbus and Boeing
(aerospace market), Microsoft and IBM (software and hardware) and the renew-
able energy sector, where for instance five producers have a market share of over
90% of worldwide wind turbine sales.7 Based on these real world observations,
for the rest of this article, it seems reasonable to assume that a monopolist is
the decision maker. Furthermore it does not matter much, because the pricing
rules differ by a multiplier that depends on the demand elasticity.
2.3 A partial comparative analysis
The price discount of the first phase
The first phase’s price discount is λγ
£
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
¤
. This
section studies the discount’s size based on the underlying parameters. It follows
a comparative analysis; the discount is partially differentiated with respect to
the parameters λ, γ and c. It is important to note that all parameters affect the
three variables t1, y(t1) and y(T ), which are fixed here. This analysis is meant
to explain intuitively the results that are derived later, when t1 and y(t1) are
endogenous, but y(T ) is not.
∂(·)
∂λ
[ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]
µ
1
γ
− λ
γ
y(t1)
¶
(26)
The first bracket of (26) is positive, the second is positive for λy(t1) < 1, which
is satisfied in the numerical simulation later. The price discount of the first
phase rises with the learning parameter of the first phase, λ. The monopolist
reduces its first phase’s price to exploit a larger learning intensity.
∂(·)
∂γ
= − λ
γ2
h
ce−λy(t1) − ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
i
+
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] [y(T )− y(t1)]
(27)
In (27), the first summand is negative, because its bracket term is positive. The
second summand is positive. The first summand exceeds the second in absolute
value conditional on eγ[y(T )−y(t1)] − 1 > γ[y(T ) − y(t1)]. This condition is met
when the produced quantity after t1 is large enough. A large learning parameter
after the innovation, γ decreases the incentive to reduce the incentive to reduce
cost before the innovation date.
7Press release of BTM Consult ApS (27.3.2008).
11
∂(·)
∂c
=
λ
γ
h
e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
i
(28)
(28) shows, how the variable part of the marginal cost level affects the price
discount of the first phase.8 The derivative is positive, because the return to
experience increases when the original cost level is high. The price discount on
p0 increases with λ and c, it decreases with γ.
The Costates
The costate variables are positive for all t, however they decrease. η0(t) declines
at a rate of the marginal cost’s derivative for the first phase, η1(t) at a rate of
the marginal cost’s derivative for the second phase. An interesting result is that
the quotient of the two costates at the optimal innovation time t1 is the quotient
of the learning parameters:
η0(t1) =
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) =
λ
γ
η1(t1)⇒
η0(t1)
η1(t1)
=
λ
γ
(29)
Figure 1 shows the course of two costates, given a cumulative production quan-
tity at the innovation date of 50 and 100. The cumulative quantity at the end of
the planning horizon is 150, thus experience becomes worthless and both costate
functions converge to the horizontal axis. At y(t1) the costates jump vertically
upward such that the costate at lim
→0
[y(t1) + ] is γλ times larger compared to
its value at lim
→0
[y(t1)− ]. Prices have been derived as functions of costates
during phase one, (1− 1ε )−1p0(t) = m+ce−λy(t)−η0(t) [see (24)] and phase two,
(1− 1ε )−1p1(t) = m+ ce−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y1(t1)] − η1(t) [see (25)]. At t1, the prices
p0(t) and p1(t) reduce to
¡
m+ ce−λy(t1)
¢
(1− 1ε ), subtracted by ηi(t)(1−
1
ε ) for
i ∈ (0, 1). Figure 1 clearly shows an upward jump of costates, which means that
prices drop discontinuously by the amount that the costates jump with their
constant multiplier.
In the past there have been government interventions that aimed to sell a fix
number of products, which are characterized through positive externalities e.g.
solar panels.9 Figure 1 shows a decrease of y(t1) from 100 to 50, keeping y(T )
and all parameters constant. The costate of the function, where the innovation
occurs earlier is lower during its first phase compared to the other costate. It
exceeds the other costate thereafter before y(t1) = 75 is reached. Afterwards it
is lower again. Therefore the price during the first phase decreases with y(t1).
The next proposition shows that the same holds true for t1.
Proposition 5 An earlier innovation date t1 increases the price p0 and de-
creases the price p1, iff y(T ) is fixed.
8Recall that MC|t=0 = m+ c
9The "100,000 roof-program" was part of the Renewable Energy Law in Germany. It
intended to install 100,000 solar panels (which would be equivalent to y(T )) in a given time
(T ).
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Figure 1: Costates jump at the date of innovation
Proof. The elasticity of demand is assumed to be constant and the monopolist
chooses the optimal innovation date t1 before production starts. Given p0 (24)
and p1 (25), prices are differentiated with respect to t1.
∂p0
∂t1
=
(γ − λ)λ
γ| {z }
>0
c
h
e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − e−λy(t1)
i
| {z }
<0
ε
ε− 1| {z }
>0
y(t1)
∂t1| {z }
>0
< 0 (30)
In (30) all terms except of one, are positive for γ > λ, c > 0, y(t1) < y(T ).
Later it is shown numerically that a delay of the innovation date increases the
cumulative quantity up to the innovation date: y(t1)∂t1 > 0.
∂p1
∂t1
=
∂p1
∂y(t1)
y(t1)
∂t1
= c
h
(γ − λ)e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
i
| {z }
>0
ε
ε− 1| {z }
>0
y(t1)
∂t1| {z }
>0
> 0 (31)
The price after t1 increases, when the innovation occurs earlier.
This result seems to be puzzling at first glance. In the presence of learning
without process innovations, the learning effect is smaller than the level effect
of costs. Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) show that "output increases over time,
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... [but] produce a lot now to lower costs, then ease off as an optimal control
strategy" [was ruled out by their results].10 This model also contains the same
effects as in the Fundenberg and Tirole model: A firm chooses a production plan
that maximizes today’s profits taking account of all future cost reductions, where
the later is determined by the learning effect. In the presence of innovations, the
learning effect is stronger, when the date of innovation occurs later. Therefore
a firm reduces p0 when t1 increases. At the same time it increases p1, because
future time (T − t1) decreases along with the benefit of future cost reduction.
The "today’s-profit maximizing-effect" is stronger than the learning effect and
a decrease of t1 comes with an increase of p0. The intuitions provided by this
partial analysis are helpful for section 3, where t∗1 is endogenous. The numerical
part of section 3 contains two parts; in the first part all variables are endogenous,
and it is shown that (30) and (31) do not hold. In the second part, where t∗1 and
y(t∗1) are endogenous, but y(T ) is not, the results provided here, appear again.
2.4 A different innovation cost function
In this section the thus far neglected innovation cost function with a differ-
ent structure is introduced. It was able to be neglected, because it depended
solely on the innovation date, which was exogenous. What happens, when
one assumes that the innovation cost function also depends on the experience
accumulated before t1 and a = a[y(t1), t1], with ∂a∂y(t1) < 0? This assump-
tion is reasonable, when the research department works closely together with
the production floor. The altered transversality condition of the first phase is
η0(t1) = −λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − ∂a[y(t1),t1]∂y(t1) . As innovation cost
decreases with y(t1), so does the marginal revenue
MR0(t) = m+
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)+
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )+
∂a[y(t1), t1]
∂y(t1)
; t0 ≤ t ≤ t1
(32)
Accordingly the price during the first phase decreases. The intuition behind the
changes are obvious; experience does not only reduce future production cost,
but also the cost of research.
3 Themodel with an endogenous innovation date
3.1 Analytical part
The optimal timing of innovation has been exogenous thus far, in this section it
will be endogenized. First the problem is solved for an innovation cost function
of the form a = a(t1). Later it is shown, what changes when a = a[y(t1), t1].
With t1 fixed, consider the following problem with the two segments,
S.0.max
p0(t)
Z t1
t0
{x0(p0, t)(p0 −m− ce−λy0(t))}dt (33)
10See proposition 2 on p. 525.
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s.t.
·
y0(t) = x0(p0, t), t ∈ [t0, t1] t0, t1 fixed
and
S.I.max
p1(t)
Z T
t1
{x1(p1, t)(p1 −m− ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(t))}dt (34)
s.t.
·
y1(t) = x1[p1, t], t ∈ [t1, T ] t1, T fixed
When p∗0 and p∗1 are solutions to the problem MP (22), given conditions (5) to
(9), then with the Hamiltonians being defined as usual,
H0(p∗0, η0(t)) ≥ H0(p0, η0(t)) ∇p0(t) ≥ 0 (35)
H1(p∗1, η1(t)) ≥ H1(p1, η1(t)) ∇p1(t) ≥ 0 (36)
where
H0(p0, η0(t)) = π
0(t) + η0(t)x(p0, t)
H1(p1, η1(t)) = π
1(t) + η1(t)x(p1, t)
Adding (35) and (36), one can see that p∗0 and p∗1 also satisfy Hamiltonian con-
dition (11). Therefore the control variables that solve (22) also solve problems
(35) and (36) respectively. Denote the maximized values of the objectives S.0.
(33) by V ∗0 (t) and S.I. (34) by V ∗1 (t). A standard result of optimal control
theory is
∂V ∗0 (t)
∂t1
= H0(t1) and
∂V ∗1 (t)
∂t∗1
= −H1(t∗1) (37)
Consider the optimal value of t∗1, denoted by t∗1 ∈ (t0, T ). If t∗1 is optimal, it
must solve
max
t1
(Z t1
t0
π0(p0, t)dt+
Z T
t1
π1(p1, t)dt− a(t1)
)
= V ∗0 (t) + V
∗
1 (t)− a(t1) (38)
∂
∂t1
[V ∗0 (t) + V
∗
1 (t)− a(t1)] = H0(t∗1)−H1(t∗1)−
∂a(t∗1)
∂t∗1
.
= 0
⇔ a0(t∗1) = π0(t∗1) + η0(t∗1)x[p0, t∗1]− π1(t∗1)− η1(t∗1)x[p1, t∗1] (39)
(39) reveals that the optimal innovation date t∗1, the difference of the first
and second phase’s returns equal the derivative of the innovation function with
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Figure 2: Benefits and costs of delaying innovation
respect to t∗1, where the word ’return’ circumscribes the instantaneous profit
flow π(t∗1) and the return to experience η(t
∗
1)x[p, t
∗
1]. A simple innovation cost
function a (·) that shall mimic reality has the following characteristics: a(t1) > 0
∇t \ t = T where a(T ) = 0, a0 < 0, a00 > 0. Thus innovation is costly if it
is implemented within the planning horizon. The cost is proportionally larger,
the sooner innovation takes place. The right side of (39) is moderately negative
over the entire planning horizon, which can be shown numerically. Therefore the
equality of both sides is guaranteed for an appropriate set of parameters. Figure
2 demonstrates that postponing innovation comes along with lower innovation
cost (left diagram), but an increase of the production cost (on the right). The
optimality condition for t∗1 (39) conveys the same result; in the optimum the
cost savings of delaying innovation per period (left side) equals the differences
of return of phase 1 and 2 (right side).
In section 2.4, the innovation cost function was changed to a[y(t1), t1]. If
one accounts for these changes here, (39) adjusts to
∂a[y(t∗1), t
∗
1]
∂t∗1
+
∂a[y(t∗1), t
∗
1]
∂y(t∗1)
∂y(t∗1)
∂t∗1
= π0(t∗1)+η0(t
∗
1)x(p0)−π1(t∗1)−η1(t∗1)x(p1, t∗1)
(40)
If ∂a[y(t1),t1]∂t1 has not changed and the assumptions
∂a[y(t1),t1]
∂y(t1)
< 0 and
∂y(t1)
∂t1
> 0 hold, then the left side of (40) decreases. The optimal date of innova-
tion would increase and the monopolist’s research budget would decrease. When
an increase in y(t1) decreases the innovation cost, then the value of waiting with
an innovation adoption increases.
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3.2 Numerical part
After introducing a specific demand function, a numerical simulation method is
used to find specific values of t∗1, y(t∗1) and y(T ). Tax and subsidy parameters
are added simultaneously. They are also helpful for the next section, when a
welfare analysis is carried out.
Demand: The per period inverse demand function is,
p(xi) =
xi−α
1− α (41)
for i ∈ (0, 1). For p(xi) as defined in (41), the price elasticity of demand is
ε = −∂x∂p
p
x =
1
α .
11 It follows from (24) and (25) that MRi = ki ⇔ pi(1− α) =
ki ⇔ x−αi = ki, where
k0 =
µ
m+
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ) +
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t
∗
1)
¶
k1 =
³
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T )
´
Sales subsidy/ tax: An ad valorem subsidy (τ > 1) or tax parameter (τ < 1) is
added, a subsidy shifts the demand function out, a tax shifts it in. A demand
function of the the type in (41), which includes the parameter τ is
xi =
µ
τ
pi(1− α)
¶β
(42)
It is helpful to transform (39) such that the t2-optimality condition becomes
x0 [p0 −MC(t∗1) + η0(t∗1)]− x1 [p1 −MC(t∗1) + η1(t∗1)] = a0(t∗1) (43)
(29), (42) and (2) or (3) are substituted in (43)
ατβ
1− α
³
k1−β0 − k
1−β
1
´
= a0(t∗1) (44)
Innovation cost: An innovation cost function that fulfills the requirements;
a(t∗1) > 0,∇t \ t = T where a(T ) = 0. a0 < 0, a00 > 0 is
a(t∗1) = ie
−μt∗1 − ie−μT (45)
The parameter i affects the level of the innovation cost, the parameter μ the
slope with respect to t∗1.
Innovation subsidy/ tax: The innovation subsidy is constructed in a way such
that the government either pays a part of the innovation cost, s > 0 or charges
a tax, s < 0. Thus the gross innovation cost is
a(t∗1) = ρ[ie
−μt∗1 − ie−μT ] (46)
11Define β = 1α . One can easily account for a time-varying demand function by multiplying
p(xi) with b(t) where b(t)β = beδt. But this does not add much to this analysis.
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where ρ = 1 − s. a0(t∗1) decreases with ρ, hence it becomes less beneficial for
the firm to procrastinate the innovation timing and the innovation date occurs
earlier when innovation is subsidized. Equation (44) can be rewritten as
ατβ
1− α
³
k1−β0 − k
1−β
1
´
= −ρμie−μt∗1 (47)
(47) is the optimality conditions for t1. In addition, one needs to express
y(t∗1) and y(T ) to solve for these three variables simultaneously. The demand
function (42) and the optimality condition pi = (1−α)−1ki solve for the per pe-
riod demand of phase 1, x0 =
³
τ
k0
´β
. As the per period production is constant,
the cumulative production quantity up to the innovation date t∗1 is simply
yM (t∗1) =
µ
τ
k0
¶β
(t∗1 − t0) (48)
Similarly, y(T ) equals the integral of the second phase’s per period production
flows between t∗1 and T , which is added to the cumulative quantity up to t∗1
yM (T ) = y(t∗1) +
µ
τ
k1
¶β
(T − t∗1) (49)
Equations (47), (48) and (49) are three independent equations that contain as
many unknowns t∗1, y(t
∗
1) and y(T ). The parameters c, m, i, γ, λ, α, μ, δ and
the planning horizon, t0 and T are known to the firm. Thus the model can be
solved numerically.12
Results
When y(T ) is endogenous then (30) does not hold. Figure 3 illustrates, how
the variables of the model t∗1, y(t∗1), y(T ) and the prices p0, p1 are affected by
τ , ρ (both upper part), λ, and γ (both lower part). The vertical axis of the
cumulative quantities is on the right side of each of the four panels, the vertical
axis of all other variables on the left side. In the upper left panel sales taxes (τ <
1) and subsidies (τ > 1), in the upper right panel innovation subsidies (ρ < 1)
and taxes (ρ > 1) vary. Taxes/ subsidies are absent when τ = ρ = 1.13 Taxes
and subsidies, either on sales or innovation cost have the same effect. Taxes
increase the prices of both phases and decrease the total cumulative production.
The cumulative quantity at the innovation date increases, whenever innovation
is postponed.
12So far a process innovation was analyzed, it is however fairly simple to account for a
product innovation in this model. When a firm does not change its cost structure, but its
product features, then it is possible to change the demand function from one with an exponent
of α to one with an exponent different from α after t∗1. This article considers the case, where
consumers do not anticipate price changes, thus the demand is equal before and after t∗1.
13The command ’fsolve’ of the computer program MATLAB solves systems of nonlinear
equations. It was used to derive t1, y(t1) and y(T ) based on (47), (48) and (49). The
parameters have been arbitrarily chosen. The results hold for other parameter sets, which
yields a solution. The parameters used here are: α = 0.9, γ = 0.05, λ = 0.01, t0 = 0, μ = 0.1,
m = 1, c = 5, T = 50 and i = 20.
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Figure 3: A comparative analysis, when all variables are endogenous
The lower panel demonstrates what happens when the learning parameter
λ varies in a range of [0.5%, 1.5%], the lower right panel shows γ varying in a
range of [4.5%, 5.5%]. A rise in either learning parameter reduces both prices
and increases total cumulative quantity. Innovation is delayed when λ increases,
it occurs earlier, when γ increases. y(t∗1) moves into the same direction as t
∗
1.
Subsidies and more intense learning therefore are shown to reduce prices. A
large λ decreases both prices but the larger price p0 is charged by the monopolist
longer, because a postponement of innovation means that the length of phase
1 increases. In the absence of discounting the average per period price is still
smaller. But if consumer discounting is high, a large λ might not be beneficial
for buyers.
So far positive externalities, which justify subsidies have been ignored. An
early distribution of solar panels is preferred to a later date, to reduce the
total carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere. Both types of subsidies
yield a lower p0 and a lower t∗1, which together guarantee that with regards to
time, more products are sold earlier, because p0 > p1. Thus both subsidies are
beneficial, when early distributions play a role.
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Results change drastically, when y(T ) is given. The results of the partial
analysis, (30) and (31) are supported by a numerical analysis, illustrated in
figure 4. The structure and the parameters of this figure are the same as in
figure 3. In figure 3 a total cumulative production quantity of around y(T ) = 8
was derived. Figure 4 shows the results, when y(T ) = 8 is assumed to be given
exogenously. Thus the optimality condition (49) is excluded from the analy-
sis. The results here have changed dramatically: innovation is postponed when
sales are subsidized. It occurs earlier, when the innovation cost is subsidized.
p0 increases when innovation is subsidized, it decreases, when sales are subsi-
dized. p1 moves into the opposite direction. These results correspond with the
analytical study above, where it was shown that ∂p0∂t1 < 0 and
∂p0
∂t1
> 0 given
y(T ) being exogenous. In the absence of subsidies the average production unit
price equals pAV = y(t∗1)p0 + [y(T )− y(t∗1)] p1 = 53.47. If a low sales subsidy
(τ = 1.05) is introduced, then the average price increases to pAV,S = 53.89. An
innovation subsidy (ρ = 0.95) decreases the average price pAV,I = 53.27. If a
regulator cares about consumer prices, but it wants to subsidize the industry
as it yields positive externalities, then an innovation subsidy is preferred over
a sales subsidy. Even though an innovation subsidy increases p0, the average
price decreases. In order to keep p0 from rising, a price constraint could be
implemented for the first time phase.
Proposition 6 A price constraint during the first phase increases the consumer
surplus and decreases t∗1.
Proof. See appendix.
The lower panels show the affect of the learning parameters. An increase of
λ reduces p0 strongly, while p1 increases moderately. An increase of the second
phase’s learning parameter γ decreases p1 and increases p0. This observation
is in line with the results from the partial analysis (26) and (27). A change
of any learning parameter affects the timing of innovation, which influences
the cumulative quantity at the innovation date positively if t∗1 increases and
negatively if t∗1 decreases. A change of y(t
∗
1) affects the prices as shown by (30)
and (31). The average price decreases, when either parameter increases. In the
baseline case λ = 1%, γ = 5% and the average price is pAV = 53.47. When
λ = 1.5%, the average price increases to pAV,λ = 52.87, when γ = 5.5% the
average prices increases to pAV,γ = 52.67.
When the timing of early distribution plays a role, one has to examine a
change of t∗1 and p0 to evaluate a policy or change of parameters in the same
way as it has been done, when y(T ) was endogenous. An innovation subsidy
yields a higher p0, but innovation occurs earlier than in the presence of a sales
subsidy, where p0 is lower and t1 is larger. With an innovation subsidy, fewer
products are sold during the first phase. However, the second phase, during
which the number of products sold per period is larger (as p1 < p0) begins
earlier. Thus a regulator who is concerned about early distributions prefers a
sales subsidy towards an innovation subsidy if she is very impatient.
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Figure 4: Comparative statics with y(T ) being exogenously determined
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4 More on welfare effects
This section contains a welfare analysis based on consumer and producer rents,
which are first derived. It is illustrated that the two types of subsidies of either
innovation or sales have different effects on consumer/ producer rents. This
article does not contain a general welfare analysis, which needs to verify clearly
the positive externalities that would induce a state to intervene. It would only
be rational to do this, if one considers a specific industry with information
pertaining to the model’s underlying parameters, which is beyond the scope of
this paper. This section shows that an innovation (sales) subsidy, which is fully
financed through a sales (innovation) tax, changes the proportion of consumer
and producer rents. This way consumer rents could be increased, which has
a market power mitigating effect.14 In this part all variables are endogenous.
The same inverse demand function holds; p = τ1−αx
−α and in the numerical
analysis, the same set of parameters is used as before.
Consumer Rents: The per-period consumer rent during the first phase, CR0t
equals the area underneath the inverse demand function above the monopoly
price.15
CR0t =
Z ∞
p0
x0[p0(t)]dp =
µ
τ
1− α
¶β Z ∞
p0
p−βdp =
µ
τ
1− α
¶β −1
1− β p
1−β
0
=
α
(1− α)2 k
1−β
0 τ
β (50)
The price is substituted for k0/(1−α) and k0 = m+γ−λγ ce−λy(t
∗
1)+λγ ce
(γ−λ)y(t∗1)−γy(T ).16
The consumer rent over the entire first phase CR0 is
CR0 =
Z t∗1
t0
CR0tdt =
ατβk1−β0
(1− α)2 (t
∗
1 − t0) (51)
Applying the same steps again, the per period consumer rent after the innovation
has taken place CR1t and the consumer rent over all these periods, CR
1 are
CR1t =
ατβk1−β1
(1− α)2 (52)
CR1 =
ατβk1−β1
(1− α)2 (T − t
∗
1) (53)
14A valuation of such a measure is not part of this analysis. It depends on the specific
industry to judge, if such a procedure is justifiable.
15A necessary assumption is that the elasticity of demand exceeds one; β = 1α > 1, to
guarantee lim
p→∞
p1−β = 0.
16An increase of α is equivalent to a decrease of the demand elasticity. Consider (50), an
increase of α increases CR0t , which is quite intuitive. A monopolist picks a lower price when
the elasticity is large.
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where k1 = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ).
Producer Rents: The producer rent of the monopoly, which equals its profit over
the entire planning horizon is
PR =
Z t∗1
t0
x0
³
p0 − ce−λy(t) −m
´
dt+
Z T
t∗1
x1
³
p1 − ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(t) −m
´
dt
=
µ
k0
1− α −m
¶µ
τ
k0
¶β
(t∗1 − t0) +
µ
k1
1− α −m
¶µ
τ
k1
¶β
(T − t∗1)
+
1
λ
h
ce−λy(t
∗
1) − ce−λy(t0)
i
+
1
γ
h
ce(γ−λ)y(t
∗
1)−γy(T ) − ce−λy(t∗1)
i
(54)
Results
The results are summarized by figure 5. In the absence of government inter-
ventions consumer and producer rents are given by the horizontal line. After a
sales subsidy is introduced to the market, consumer and producer rents jump
upwards to the level, where the falling curves touch the vertical axis. Then an
innovation tax comes into place. It is depicted on the horizontal axis of each
panel. An increase of the innovation tax reduces consumer and producer wel-
fare, which is expressed by the falling graph. Producer rents fall much faster
than consumer rents. Hence a sales subsidy, which is financed through an in-
novation tax has market power mitigating effects. This illustration shall not
propose such a market intervention, rather it shows that either subsidy type
has different effects on producer and consumer rents. A similar figure could be
shown for welfare changes through an innovation subsidy that is financed by a
sales tax, where the upper curve is steeper for consumers.
5 Conclusion
The innovation of this model is that it is able to evaluate distribution and inno-
vation subsidies, while innovation costs depend on time, and learning depends
on cumulative production. This article examines the pricing of a monopolist
and a public owned firm in an environment, where the unit cost of production
decreases through learning. The learning intensity decreases with cumulative
production. The firm can invest in an innovation process. At the time, when
research is successful, learning for a given production quantity jumps. Thus a
lower cost level can be achieved with less cumulative production added. So far
models, which have included learning and innovation have assumed that learn-
ing occurs through time. Hence these models are not applicable to questions in
the area of industrial organization, because learning has no effect on production
or pricing.
In the absence of discounting it is shown that prices before and after the
innovation date are constant. The price of the first phase exceeds the price of
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Figure 5: Welfare effects of government interventions
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the second phase, hence there is a downward jump when the new technology is
implemented. If discounting is included in the analysis, prices before and after
the innovation date rise, because the return on learning falls. The problem of a
monopolist and social planner are quite similar, however, this analysis concen-
trates on the monopolist, because learning industries, although often severely
subsidized, are generally not publicly owned. Other central results of this paper
are: innovation subsidies and sales subsidies reduce the prices of both phases if
all variables (the timing of innovation t1, the cumulative production quantities
at the innovation date, y(t1) and at the end of the planning horizon, y(T )) are
endogenous. Both types of subsidies induces the date of innovation to occur ear-
lier. Therefore the total quantity produced during the entire planning horizon
increases. The production plan in the presence of subsidies lies entirely above
the production plan without subsidies. Thus if early distributions yield positive
externalities, then subsidies on sales and on innovation contain an additional
positive effect.17 Another central result emerges, when the total production
y(T ) is restricted.18 In this case the two kinds of subsidies analyzed have dif-
ferent effects. Innovation subsidies decrease the innovation date, but the price
during the first phase increases (thus sales decrease). It is shown that a price
cap can reduce the first phase’s price, furthermore it induces innovation to occur
earlier. In order to evaluate an innovation subsidy one would need to consider
the negative effect of the "early-distribution argument". Sales subsidies induce
the innovation timing to occur later, which means that for a longer period of
time, consumer pay the higher first phase’s price p0. The positive effect is that
p0 falls, which is why the "early-distribution argument" might be in favour of
sales subsidies. The two subsidies considered have different effects on consumer
and producer surplus. It is also shown that a subsidy on innovation (sales),
which is financed through a tax on sales (innovation), changes the proportion
of consumer and producer rents. Customers generally benefit more from sales
subsidies, producers from innovation subsidies.
This paper does not conduct a general welfare analysis; for that one would
need to measure the cause for government subsidies (positive externalities). This
would only be feasible, if one would have specific learning parameters and the
parameters of the innovation cost function, which describe a specific market.
This goes beyond the scope of this article and is left for future work. It would
also be interesting to show, how the market equilibrium changes, when the date
of innovation is anticipated by customers. Most likely it would be optimal for
some to wait and purchase the product after the innovation date. This would
reduce the learning before t1 unless innovation is delayed by the firm. Another
extension of this paper could add more insight by accounting for a stochastic
innovation process, market entry and technology switching cost.
17 In the renewable energy sector early installations increase the positive externality. The
total amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is reduced, because renewable energy sources
are substitutes to conventional energy sources that emit C02.
18For example in medium-sized countries, there is a fixed number of places, where wind
energy plants can be built.
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6 Appendix
Proof of lemma 2
A transversality condition for the state variable solves for const1 in (13).
The total cost before t1 is sunk and can be ignored, η0(t1) has an influence only
on future cost. The area below the learning curve between y(t1) and y(t), for
t ∈ [t1, T ] is defined as
Γ [y(t)] =
Z y(t)
y(t1)
m+ce−λy(t1)−γ[v−y(t1)] dv = m[y(t)−y(t1)]+
c
γ
[e−λy(t1)−e−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)]
(55)
The time derivative is Γ˙ = dΓdt = x(t)[m+ ce
−λy(t1)−γ[y(t)−y(t1)]], thus the time
dependent area under the learning curve or the total cost of the second phase isZ T
t1
Γ˙dt = [y(T )− y(t1)]m+
c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]
The usual methods of the principle of variations are used. At first the op-
timal path of the production flow is displaced for the cost that occurs after t1;
x(p1(t), t)→ x(p1(t), t) + δφ(t), −λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
Γ [y(t)] = y(T )m− y(t1)m−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
1
γ
ce−λy(t1)
Γ [y(t)]δ = [
Z T
t0
[x(t) + δφ(t)]dt]m− [
Z t1
t0
[x(t) + δφ(t)]dt]m
+
1
γ
ce−λ
U t1
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt − 1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
U t1
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
U T
t0
[x(t)+δφ(t)]dt
In a second step the displaced total cost after t1 (called Γ [y(t)]
δ) is differentiated
with respect to δ. The derivative is evaluated at δ = 0, employing the standard
calculus of variations approach,
∂Γ [y(t)]δ
∂δ
|(δ=0) =
½
−λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¾Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt (56)
+{m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )}
Z T
t1
φ(t)dt
where (56) separates the terms multiplied by
R t1
t0
φ(t)dt and
R T
t1
φ(t)dt respec-
tively. For any t > t1, the marginal cost at T are collected. This result is
similar to Spence’s (1981) learning model. Given a production plan, he shows
that when a firm extends its production by one unit at any time, then the in-
cremental cost is equal to marginal cost at the end of the planning horizon.
For t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 we collect another term; −λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) <
0. For t = t1 the incremental cost is thus the marginal cost of the second
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phase at T plus
h
−λγ ce−λy(t1) +
λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
i
. The value of delaying
the innovation by one production unit is obtained when this term is multi-
plied by −1. Thus the first phase’s costate at the innovation date is η0(t1) =
λ
γ ce
−λy(t1) − λγ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ).
Proof of proposition 3
When a firm produces an additional quantity 0 before the innovation occurs
(t0 ≤ t ≤ t1) then the pricing rule (24) holds. The incremental cost for the first
time phase is computed next. The total cost is equal to
y(T )m+
c
λ
[1− e−λy(t1)] + c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] (57)
When the firm produces an additional unit 0 before the innovation takes place,
then total cost increases to
(y(T ) + 0)m+
c
λ
[1− e−λ[y(t1)+0]] + c
γ
[e−λ[y(t1)+0]− e−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]
(58)
The incremental cost during the first phase is denoted by IC0
IC0 =
(58)− (57)
0
= c{−e
−λ[y(t1)+0]
λ0
− e−λy(t1)] + e
−λ[y(t1)+0] − e−λy(t1)
γ0
.
−e
−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]
γ0
}+m (59)
It needs to be shown that (24) is equivalent to setting the marginal revenue equal
to the incremental cost (59). ce−λy(t1) is equivalent to lim
0−>0
− cλ0 [e
−λ[y(t1)+0]−
e−λy(t1)] and −λγ e−λy(t1) to lim0−>0
e−λ[y(t1)+dx]−e−λy(t1)
γ0
. In order to show the
equivalence of the third term, it has to be transformed: lim
0−>0
− 1γ0 [e
−λ[y(t1)+0]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]−
e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] = − 1γ0 [e
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )−λ0 − e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]]. It
follows that lim
0−>0
− 1γ0 [e
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )−λ0−e−λ[y(t1)]−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]] = λγ e(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ),
where the following rule was applied: lim
0−>0
ea−λ0−ea
0
= ea lim
0−>0
e−λ−1
 = e
aλ,
for any constant a ∈ R. This completes the first part of the proof. During
the first time phase, the monopolist behaves optimally, when it sets marginal
revenue equal to incremental cost at each instant of time. Next, the second
time phase ∇t1 ≤ t ≤ T is analyzed. (25) is the optimality condition during
this phase. When the firm produces an additional unit 1 after the innovation
has occurred, total cost (57) increases to
(y(T ) + 1)m+
c
λ
[1− e−λy(t1)] + c
γ
[e−λy(t1) − e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]] (60)
IC1 is the incremental cost that occurs through an additional 1 after t1
IC1 =
(60)− (57)
1
=
c0
γ1
[e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]−e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]] (61)
27
(25) is equivalent to (61), because ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)] = lim
1−>0
c
γ1
[e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )−y(t1)]−
e−λy(t1)−γ[y(T )+1−y(t1)]].
Proof of proposition 4
Pricing during the first phase ( t ≤ t1); when r 6= 0
This section reconstructs equation (24) in the presence of discounting with
t0 = 0. The costate that contains a discount rate is denoted by ψ0(t) = e−rt
η0(t). The transversality condition for ψ0(t1) has to be derived. It is shown
that (12) holds, when η0(t) is substituted for ψ0(t)
∂H
∂p0(t)
= x0(p0(t), t)+p0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
−∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
(m+ce−λy(t))+ψ0(t)
∂x0(p0(t), t)
∂p0(t)
.
= 0
⇔ p0(1−
1
ε(t)
) = m+ ce−λy(t) − ψ0(t) (62)
The second first order condition (13), becomes
ψ˙0(t)− rψ0(t) = −
∂H
∂y0(t)
multiplying this equation by e−rt and transforming yields
⇔ e−rtψ˙0(t)− re−rtψ0(t) = −e−rt
∂H
∂y0(t)
⇔ e−rtψ0(t) + const3 =
Z h
e−rt(−λ)ce−λy0(t)x0(t)
i
dt
⇔ e−rtψ0(t) + const3 = e−rtce−λy0(t) + r
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
⇔ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt− ertconst3 (63)
In order to find an expression of the costate at the innovation date ψ0(t1), the
total cost that occurs after the innovation is expressed by V .
V =
Z T
t1
n
x1(p1(t)(m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t))e−rt
o
dt
Integration by parts yields:
V =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
my1(t)−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)
¾
dt
+e−rt
½
my(T )− 1
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) −my(t1) +
1
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¾
Applying the usual methods of the principle of variations; the optimal path of
the production flow x(p1(t), t)→ x(p1(t), t) + δφ(t) in V is displaced, before its
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derivative is evaluated at δ = 0 according to the standard calculus of variations
approach.
V =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
m
Z t
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
U t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
U t
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt
¾
dt
+e−rt{m
Z T
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt−
1
γ
ce(γ−λ)
U t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt−γ
U T
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt
−m
Z t1
t0
[x1(t) + δφ(t)] dt+
1
γ
ce−λ
U t1
t0
[x1(t)+δφ(t)]dt}
∂V
∂δ
]δ=0 =
Z T
t1
re−rt
½
m
Z t
t0
φ(t)dt− γ − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t
t0
φ(t)dt
¾
dt
+e−rt{m
Z T
t0
φ(t)dt−γ − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
Z T
t0
φ(t)dt
−m
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt− λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt}
=
Z T
t1
re−rt
½h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
i Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ − γ − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
Z t1
t0
φ(t)dt
¾
dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
φ(t)dt}
(64)
The term
Z T
t1
re−rt
n
γ−λ
γ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
R t1
t0
φ(t)dt
o
dt can be ignored. It origi-
nates from displacing the cumulative quantity before t1 after the innovation has
already taken place. As the firm cannot change y(t1) after t1, it cannot effect
the cost during the first time phase at t1. It just has an effect on the second
phase’s cost. One can also examine this term itself and recognize that for any t
it is zero, because when t < t1 then the first integral becomes zero, when t > t1,
then the second integral is zero. Hence (64) becomesZ T
t1
re−rt
½h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
i Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
φ(t)dt}
(65)
One can replace the variables of the first term above. The range of τ is [t0, t]
and that of t is: [t1, T ] → t0 ≤ τ ≤ t ≤ T . After replacing the variables
t0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T , the range is [t, T ] for τ , when t > t1 and it is [t1, T ] when
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t ≤ t1. Before the swap, t was larger than t1 hence τ is larger than t1 after the
swap. When t is smaller than t1, then τ ’s lower limit is t1. When t is larger than
t1, then τ ’s lower limit is t. The new range of t is [t0, T ]. Figure 6 illustrates
the range before and after replacing the variables t and τ .
(65) can be transformed toZ t1
t0
re−rt
½h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
i Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt+
Z T
t1
re−rt
½h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(t)
i Z t
t0
φ(τ)dτ
¾
dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
φ(t)dt}
The variables are replaced next.
=
Z t1
t0
(Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
(Z T
t
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
φ(t)dt}
=
Z t1
t0
(Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt
+e−rt{
Z t1
t0
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
φ(t)dt
+
Z T
t1
(Z T
t
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt+
Z T
t1
e−rt
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
φ(t)dt}
=
Z t1
t0
(
e−rt
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
+
Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt
+
Z T
t1
(
e−rt
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
+
Z T
t
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
)
φ(t)dt}
(66)
The same reasoning as in (56) applies here hence the costate of the first phase
with a non-zero discount rate at t1 equals,
→ ψ0(t1) = e−rt1
∙
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¸
−
Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
(67)
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Figure 6: Exchanging variables
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The constant const3 is found in the following.
⇔ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt− ertconst3
→ ψ0(t1) = ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
− ert1const3
→ ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
− ert1const3 =
e−rt1
∙
λ
γ
ce−λy(t1) − λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T )
¸
−
Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
−
Z T
t1
r
h
m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−y(T )
i
e−rτdτ
⇔ ert1const3 =
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1+
Z T
t1
r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ
+ce−λy0(t1) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
It is substituted into the costate function (67), which is
→ ψ0(t) = ce−λy0(t) + rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
−
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1−
Z T
t1
r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ−ce−λy0(t1)
(68)
Finally one can substitute the costate in equation (68) to find an expression,
how the monopolist sets the price during the first time phase.
p0(1−
1
ε(t)
) = m+ ce−λy0(t) − ce−λy0(t) − rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
+
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1+
Z T
t1
r[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ+ce−λy0(t1)
∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
⇔MR0(t) = m+
∙
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
¸
e−rt1 + ce−λy0(t1)
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+∙
rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt
¸
t=t1
−rert
Z
e−rtce−λy0(t)dt+r
Z T
t1
[m+ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−rτdτ
⇔MR0(t) = m+
λ
γ
ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(T ) +
γ − λ
γ
ce−λy(t1)
+r
Z t1
t
h
m+ ce−λy0(τ)
i
e−r(τ−t)dτ + r
Z T
t1
[m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(τ)]e−r(τ−t)dτ
(69)
With a positive discount rate, there are two additional terms in the optimality
condition. These reflect the fact that the return to experience or learning,
which is expressed by a lower future cost, matters less, due to the presence of
discounting. The optimal plan is to increase p0 and thus present profits at the
expense of future profits. Note that (69) reduces to (24), when r = 0.
Pricing during the second phase ( t > t1); when r 6= 0
(25) and (17) can be rewritten to account for discounting
MR1(t) = m+ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t) − ψ1(t) (70)
ψ1(t) = ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(t)
+ rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt− e−rtconst4 (71)
Extending production at t = T does not increase the profit, if the firm behaves
optimally. Hence ψ1(T ) = 0.
→ ψ1(T ) = ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T)
+
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
−e−rT const4 = 0
⇔ ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T ) +
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
= e−rT const4
→ ψ1(t) = ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(t)
+ rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt− ce(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T )
−
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
MR1(t) = m+ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T)−rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt+
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
⇔MR1(t) = m+ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T)−rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt+
∙
rert
Z
e−rte(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy(t)dt
¸
t=T
During the second phase, the monopolist sets p1 such that
⇔MR1(t) = m+ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(T )
+ r
Z T
t
h
m+ ce
(γ−λ)y(t1)−γy1(τ)
i
e−r(τ−t)dτ
(72)
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With a positive discount rate, there is an additional term. Again, the optimality
condition reflects the fact that the return to experience is in the future, which
is discounted, thus p1 rises. (72) reduces to (25), when r = 0.
Proof of proposition 6
For a fix total production quantity y(T ), it is shown analytically and nu-
merically that a subsidy on innovation cost, induces the innovation to occur
earlier and thus p0 to increase. The welfare loss could be encountered by a price
ceiling during this phase. The price ceiling would have a counter effect, when
the date of innovation is delayed by the introduction of a price constraint. In
this case, consumers would pay the higher price p0 for a longer period of time.
The answer is a straightforward extension of the preceding section and is based
on a method that is used in Rees (1986). p0 is constant, therefore either the
price constraint p − p0 ≥ 0, where p is the price ceiling binds over the entire
interval [t0, t1] or it does not bind at all. When it does not bind, it has no
effect. Assume it does bind, and p∗0 > p, where p∗0 is the optimal price set by the
monopolist; in this case the monopolist looses some of its profit due to the price
cap. This loss is denoted by R[x0(p)], with Rx0 < 0, and R > 0 if x < x(p0).
The per period quantity x0 on which R depends upon is considered as a func-
tion of p. Whenever p0 ≤ p, then x > x(p0) and R ≡ 0. The new objective
is Max
x0,x1,t1
MP 0 =
Z t1
t0
£
π0(t)−R(x(p))
¤
dt +
Z T
t1
π1(t)dt − a(t1) subject to the
constraints (5)-(9). The problem can be divided into two segments. The maxi-
mand over the first phase [t0, t1] is V ∗0 ≡Max
R t1
t0
£
π0(t)−R(x0(p0))
¤
dt−a(t1),
that of the second phase is V ∗1 ≡ Max
Z T
t1
π1(t)dt. t∗1 maximizes the sum
V ∗0 +V
∗
1 , and satisfies ∂ (V
∗
0 + V
∗
1 ) /t1 $ 0, from which the optimality condition
a0(t∗1) +R(x(p0)) = π
0(t∗1)+ η0(t
∗
1)x[p0(t
∗
1), t
∗
1]− π1(t∗1)− η1(t∗1)x[p1(t∗1), t∗1] can
be derived. Aside from R the optimality condition is the same as (39). The
introduction of a price constraint decreases t∗1. The low price p1 is charged for
a longer time span, because the length of phase 2 increases. In addition, an
earlier innovation date causes p1 to decrease further.
Summing up one can say that the introduction of a price constraint along
with an innovation subsidy increases consumer rents during the entire planning
horizon. Producers receive lower revenues, when y(T ) is fixed, because prices
do not increase, however, their innovation cost declines, due to the subsidy.
Their production cost decreases, because producers learn with a larger learning
parameter sooner.
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